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INTRODUCTION 
In McCleskey v. Kemp, the United States Supreme Court rejected the 
use of statistical evidence of racism in the criminal justice system to show a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.1 If states are seeking or imposing 
  
 ∗ Associate Professors of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. This 
piece is dedicated to the memory of Prof. David Baldus, whose scholarship set the high 
standards for death penalty research that we all strive to meet. He will be sorely missed. We 
also wish to thank the outstanding research librarians at our John F. Schaefer Law Library, 
the present and past editors of the Michigan State Law Review, and the many people in 
North Carolina who helped us understand how the Racial Justice Act came into law. 
 1. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
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the death penalty in a racially disparate manner, the Court noted, that is a 
matter for state legislatures to address.2 More than twenty years later, North 
Carolina heeded this suggestion and passed the Racial Justice Act of 2009 
(RJA).3 North Carolina was only the second state to pass legislation in re-
sponse to the McCleskey decision despite numerous local and federal efforts 
to pass a racial justice act.4 Kentucky passed similar legislation in 1998, but 
the Kentucky law provides for only an almost fatally narrow claim.5 In this 
respect, North Carolina stands alone in providing capital defendants a strong 
claim for relief based on statistical evidence that “race was a significant 
factor in decisions to seek or impose the sentence of death in the county, the 
prosecutorial district, the judicial division, or the State at the time the death 
sentence was sought or imposed.”6 
The paper considers why North Carolina passed the RJA when it did. 
North Carolina (or any state) could have accepted the Court’s invitation to 
expand its inquiry into the role of race in its death penalty system at any 
point in the past two decades. North Carolina is hardly averse to capital 
punishment; it has more than 150 people on death row and dozens facing 
capital prosecutions.7 It has executed forty-three people since 1976.8 What 
changed over the past two decades to prompt the North Carolina General 
Assembly to pass a law of this scope and magnitude? 
As a starting point, simple politics cannot explain it: the balance of 
power between Democrats and Republicans did not undergo a dramatic shift 
  
 2. Id. at 319 (“McCleskey’s arguments are best presented to the legislative bodies. 
It is not the responsibility—or indeed even the right—of this Court to determine the appro-
priate punishment for particular crimes.”). 
 3. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2010-2012 (2011). 
 4. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Legislating Racial Fairness in Criminal Justice, 39 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 233, 238-41 (2007).  
 5. The Kentucky statute is limited to pretrial claims of intentional race discrimina-
tion in that defendant’s case. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.300(1)-(5) (West 2010). The de-
fendant bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that race was “the 
basis” of the decision to seek a death sentence in the case. Id. In practice, few claims are 
raised under the Kentucky Racial Justice Act. Johnson, supra note 4, at 243. Some evidence 
suggests that, despite its narrow applicability and rare invocation, “the system has become 
somewhat more evenhanded in its treatment of black- and white-victim cases” in some parts 
of Kentucky. David C. Baldus, George Woodworth & Catherine M. Grosso, Race and Pro-
portionality Since McCleskey v. Kemp (1987): Different Actors with Mixed Strategies of 
Denial and Avoidance, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 143, 147 (2007); see also Johnson, 
supra note 4, at 243-44 (discussing survey results showing some evidence of a possible re-
duction in bias in the system, but concluding that the “actual effect” is “hard to assess”). 
 6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2011. 
 7. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 2 (2011), avail-
able at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf. 
 8. Id. at 3. 
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during the relevant time period.9 In addition, no evidence suggests that the 
influence of race in capital punishment has grown more pernicious since 
McCleskey, reaching a tipping point that forced legislators to act. Many 
studies have been done on the role of race in capital punishment in the years 
since McCleskey, including at least three studies in North Carolina.10 Most 
of these studies show that race of victim discrimination continues to play a 
role in many capital punishment systems.11 Likewise, evidence suggests that 
race continues to be a factor in jury selection.12 Yet, we are not aware of a 
single instance of legislative or judicial reform in response to a finding of 
race discrimination.13 We are aware of only one case prior to the passage of 
the RJA in which a defendant’s claim of race discrimination met with suc-
cess.14 Indeed, the narrative on race and capital punishment has stagnated 
with each side repeating a well-practiced argument to little avail. 
  
 9. For a history of representatives’ party affiliations from 1931-2011, see N.C. 
LEGISLATIVE LIBRARY, N.C. GENERAL ASSEMBLY PARTY AFFILIATIONS (2011), available at 
http://www.ncleg.net/library/Documents/GAPartyAffiliations.pdf. 
 10. See generally U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD–90–57, DEATH 
PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (1990) [here-
inafter GAO Report], available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat11/140845.pdf (summarizing 
capital charging and sentencing studies between 1972 and 1990 and finding consistent evi-
dence of race of victim discrimination); David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Dis-
crimination and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment: Reflections on the Interaction of Fact 
and Perception, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1411 (2004) (updating the GAO Report and reaching 
similar conclusions). Three North Carolina studies include Isaac Unah, Empirical Analysis of 
Race and the Process of Capital Punishment in North Carolina, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 609; 
Amy R. Stauffer, et al., The Interaction Between Victim Race and Gender on Sentencing 
Outcomes in Capital Murder Trials: A Further Exploration, 10 HOMICIDE STUD. 98 (2006); 
Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Death Sentencing in North Carolina, 1980-
2007, 89 N.C. L. REV 2119 (2011). 
 11. Baldus & Woodworth, supra note 10, at 1425-26 (quoting and updating the 
review of death penalty studies by the General Accounting Office published in the GAO 
Report, supra note 10). 
 12. David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder 
Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3 (2011) (finding race to be a 
factor in the exercise of peremptory challenges); Mary R. Rose, The Peremptory Challenge 
Accused of Race or Gender Discrimination? Some Data from One County, 23 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 695 (1999) (finding race to be a factor in the exercise of peremptory challenges). 
 13. See generally Baldus, Woodworth & Grosso, supra note 5 (reviewing courts and 
legislators for evidence of reform based on a finding of race discrimination). 
 14. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Litigating for Racial Fairness After McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 178, 179-80 (2007) (reporting on the case of Theodore 
Kelly in South Carolina); John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Post-
McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1771, 
1807-08 (1998) (reporting that a survey of post-McCleskey racial discrimination claims in 
capital cases failed to identify a single capital case where a claimant prevailed on a racial 
discrimination claim). As discussed below, on April 20, 2012, a North Carolina trial court 
vacated Marcus Robinson's death sentence on the grounds that race had been a significant 
factor in the state’s decision to exercise peremptory strikes. North Carolina v. Robinson, No. 
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So what changed in North Carolina? And, what can the remarkable 
passage of the RJA tell us about future efforts to address racism in capital 
punishment regimes or the criminal justice system? In Part II, we consider 
the litigation strategy that led to the landmark decisions in Furman v. Geor-
gia (1972)15 and McCleskey v. Kemp (1987).16 While the primary goal of 
these movements was the abolition of capital punishment, a strong second-
ary goal concerned addressing the impact of race in criminal justice.17 This 
section contrasts the results of the litigation strategy to the RJA and high-
lights the ways the RJA expands opportunities to inquire into the role of 
race in criminal justice that exceed the limits of McCleskey v. Kemp.18 In 
Part III, we draw on the work of socio-legal scholars examining the ways in 
which social movement organizations have effected change in other do-
mains, such as civil rights and environmental reform, to consider the 
strengths of a united social movement (the RJA movement) that emerged 
from the confluence of the North Carolina Legislative Black Caucus, the 
North Carolina branch of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP), and the wide group of organizations loosely or-
ganized under the umbrella of the North Carolina Coalition for a Moratori-
um (NCCM). The RJA movement was instrumental in passing the RJA. 
This social movement has drawn together a diverse array of associations 
and individuals interested in limiting the impact of race on the criminal jus-
tice system. We then look, in Part IV, at how the social and political land-
scape in North Carolina, and nationally, changed in the years preceding the 
RJA’s passage to understand how external changes may have facilitated 
North Carolina’s receptivity to reforms like a racial justice act. In Part V, 
we look more closely at key aspects of the 2009 campaign to pass a racial 
justice act. The racial justice act campaign, itself, provides useful infor-
mation on RJA’s potential impact. In conclusion, we consider what the pas-
sage of the RJA may tell us about the potential for the RJA to succeed in 
opening a broader discussion on the role of race in capital punishment in 
North Carolina, concluding that there are reasons to be optimistic. 
  
91 CRS 23143, at *45, available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/marcus_robinson 
_order.pdf. 
 15. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 16. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 17. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 290 (2002) 
(noting that racism had been the early reason for involvement in death penalty litigation for 
the Legal Defense Fund); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Race and the Death Penalty Before and 
After McCleskey, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 34, 41 (2007) (“Evidence of caste discrimi-
nation and capricious inequality played a significant part in [the Furman] argument.”); 
HERBERT H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 37-38 (1996) (noting the historical basis 
for discrimination claims by the Legal Defense Fund). 
 18. 481 U.S. 279. 
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I. THE LONG STRUGGLE TO CONFRONT RACE IN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
Few would argue that race has never influenced decision making in 
capital punishment in the United States. Indeed, the historical role of race in 
capital punishment is legendary. Consider, for example, the history of 
lynching19 or the legacy of openly racist criminal laws under which black 
defendants faced a death penalty for certain crimes for which white defend-
ants received a lesser penalty.20 Confronting this sordid history has been no 
simple task,21 and many recognize ways in which its legacy persists.22 In this 
section, we seek to juxtapose the potential of the RJA to address this legacy 
with the constitutional law that emerged from a concerted litigation strategy 
in the late twentieth century. 
A. The Constitutional Litigation Strategy Disappoints When the Court 
Won’t Bite 
Faced with hostile state legislators and public opinion that favored 
capital punishment and tolerated racism, death penalty activists in the 1960s 
implemented a strategy of constitutional litigation to challenge racism in the 
death penalty regime.23 McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) represents the bitter end 
to that strategy.24 The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. 
(LDF) played an essential role in the framing and implementation of this 
strategy.25 
  
 19. See generally FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN AMERICA (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006) (collecting articles 
on the history of lynching in the United States and the link between that history and the mod-
ern death penalty).  
 20. Dorothy E. Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System Free of Racial 
Bias: An Abolitionist Framework, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 272-73 (2007) (docu-
menting disparate laws (citing RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND LAW (1997); BANNER, 
supra note 17)); Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 35 (documenting disparate laws (citing 
KENNEDY, supra, at 84-85; BANNER, supra note 17, at 140-42)).  
 21. Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 35-37 (discussing efforts to end systemic discrim-
ination through the federal Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment). For a 
review of the racially charged history of capital punishment in North Carolina, see Seth 
Kotch & Robert P. Mosteller, The Racial Justice Act and the Long Struggle with Race and 
the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2031, 2043-77 (2010). 
 22. Roberts, supra note 20, at 262 (noting the persistence of racism); DAVID COLE, 
NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999). 
 23. HAINES, supra note 17, at 25-26 (describing a “new strategy of attacking capital 
punishment through the courts” beginning in the 1960s). 
 24. Id. at 76 (noting that McCleskey “represented the last gasp” for the litigation-
centered approach to abolition). 
 25. Id. at 25; see also Eric Muller, The Legal Defense Fund’s Capital Punishment 
Campaign: The Distorting Influence of Death, 4 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 158, 158 (1985). 
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LDF has used carefully crafted litigation in the struggle for racial jus-
tice since 194026 and shepherded the litigation strategy intended to challenge 
the constitutionality of the death penalty on racial grounds.27 While LDF 
and others advanced race claims primarily as part of a death penalty aboli-
tionist strategy, claims challenging racism resonated and gained credence in 
part because of the LDF’s history of defending blacks in southern rape cas-
es.28 Observers widely believed race played a significant role in determining 
the allocation of death sentences in all kinds of rape and murder cases.29  
Even before race litigation took center stage, the Supreme Court had 
addressed the issue indirectly in Furman v. Georgia.30 In Furman, the Su-
preme Court posited that the “arbitrary” nature of the death penalty resulted 
from allowing key decision makers, i.e., prosecutors and jurors, too much 
discretion in identifying which cases warranted a death sentence.31 The 
Court held that Georgia’s death penalty system was flawed in that it failed 
to limit the death penalty’s application to the most deserving offenders.32 
The Court, therefore, required states seeking to keep the death penalty as a 
sentencing option to enact systems to narrow its application.33 Four years 
after Furman, the Court recognized that a state could comply with this man-
date by identifying aggravating factors that must exist in addition to the 
crime to render it death-eligible.34 
  
 26. Who We Are, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUC. FUND, INC., 
http://naacpldf.org/about-ldf (last visited Sept. 23, 2011); see generally JACK GREENBERG, 
CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: LEGAL BATTLES OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2004). 
 27. HAINES, supra note 17, at 25-26. 
 28. Id. at 25, 27-28. 
 29. Id. at 27-28, 76. 
 30. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Several scholars have noted that while concerns about 
racial equality likely motivated many of the Court’s most important criminal procedure deci-
sions, the Court rarely addressed race explicitly. See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The 
Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1156-59 (1998) (arguing that the 
“context that gave rise to modern criminal procedure was institutionalized racism” but ob-
serving the Court’s strategy of “fight[ing] it indirectly through general constitutional stand-
ards that did not explicitly address race but that were nonetheless calculated to constrain 
racially motivated policies”); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and 
the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 964-65 (1999) (noting that the Court’s anal-
ysis in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) was entirely race neutral but for one footnote dis-
missing concerns about the disparate impact allowing police to stop and frisk based on rea-
sonable suspicion would have on racial minorities); Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judi-
cial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1305-06 (1982). 
 31. See, e.g., 408 U.S. at 255-56 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 32. Id.; 408 U.S. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 33. See, e.g., id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring), 314 (White, J., concurring). 
 34. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196-97 (1976). North Carolina’s statute lists 
eleven such factors. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e) (2011). At least one of these factors 
must be proven for a defendant convicted of capital murder to be eligible for the death penal-
ty. § 15A-2000(b)(1). 
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Limiting the cases eligible for capital punishment theoretically con-
strains the decision makers’ discretion, and, therefore, the potential for bias 
to influence decision making. Activists and scholars have questioned 
whether this kind of structural reform achieves its goals.35 Looking to the 
North Carolina system as an example, some of the aggravating factors that 
render a murder death eligible in that system are straightforward and clear 
in their application.36 However, the statute defines, and the Supreme Court 
has permitted, others, like the requirement that a murder be “especially hei-
nous, atrocious, or cruel,”37 that do little to narrow the field of contenders 
for death eligibility.38 The North Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted 
this factor quite broadly,39 upholding a finding that a particular murder was 
heinous, atrocious, and cruel based on circumstances ranging from pro-
longed physical or sexual torture,40 to suffering more psychological in na-
ture, such as when a victim pleaded for his life or was conscious that death 
was imminent.41 The wide range of circumstances that render a murder hei-
nous, atrocious, and cruel means that those assessing the presence or ab-
  
 35. See, e.g., Jack Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital Punishment, 
99 HARV. L. REV. 1670, 1675 (1986) (“We have a system of capital punishment that results 
in infrequent, random, and erratic executions, one that is structured to inflict death neither on 
those who have committed the worst offenses nor on defendants of the worst character.”); 
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades 
of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 438 (1995) 
(“We are left with the worst of all possible worlds: the Supreme Court’s detailed attention to 
death penalty law has generated negligible improvements over the pre-Furman era, but has 
helped people to accept without second thoughts—much less ‘sober’ ones—our profoundly 
failed system of capital punishment.”); Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence, and Guided 
Discretion in the Supreme Court’s Capital Sentencing Jurisprudence, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1151, 1151-52, 1194 (2003) (reviewing the inherent contradiction in the Supreme Court 
death penalty jurisprudence and raising questions about whether it achieves any of its goals); 
RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., STRUCK BY LIGHTENING: THE CONTINUING 
ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY THIRTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER ITS RE-INSTATEMENT IN 
1976 (2011), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/StruckByLight 
ning.pdf. 
 36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(2) (prior capital offense); § 15A-2000(e)(11) 
(multiple victims). 
 37. § 15A-2000(e)(9). 
 38. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1976) (upholding Florida’s especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator (quoting Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 
1975))); see also Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 465, 471 (1993) (approving an Idaho ag-
gravator that asked whether “‘the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life’” (quot-
ing IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(g)(6) (1987))). 
 39. See Richard A. Rosen, The “Especially Heinous” Aggravating Circumstance in 
Capital Cases—The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REV. 941, 975-77 (1986). 
 40. See, e.g., State v. Sexton, 444 S.E.2d 879, 909, 911 (1994) (upholding a finding 
of heinous, atrocious, and cruel when the victim was sexually assaulted and strangled with 
her stockings). 
 41. Rosen, supra note 39, at 976 (citing State v. Oliver, 307 S.E.2d 304 (1983)). 
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sence of this factor retain a great deal of discretion in deciding who deserves 
to die. 
Moreover, the procedural reform addressed only jury decision mak-
ing—whether to impose a death sentence at trial; it only tangentially con-
strained the decision to charge a case capitally. A number of states, includ-
ing North Carolina, first responded to Furman’s mandate by instituting a 
mandatory death sentencing scheme in which a death sentence was automat-
ic upon a conviction of first-degree murder.42 The Court struck down this 
system in Woodson v. North Carolina as providing too little discretion to 
juries.43 North Carolina also attempted to limit prosecutorial discretion by 
requiring prosecutors to seek the death penalty in every statutorily death-
eligible case.44 This system failed to eradicate prosecutorial discretion be-
cause prosecutors could simply stipulate to the absence of a statutory aggra-
vating factor, a practice unlikely to be challenged by defendants.45 
Thus, despite the Furman Court’s mandate to constrain and guide cap-
ital decision makers so that only the most deserving are sentenced to death, 
the new process still afforded substantial discretion. With this discretion 
came the opportunity to exercise mercy and vindictiveness, as well as to 
discriminate based on both legitimate and illegitimate factors.46 Further-
more, movement activists and others remained convinced that racism had an 
ongoing influence on capital punishment regimes.47 
  
 42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975). 
 43. 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976). 
 44. See State v. Case, 410 S.E.2d 57, 58 (N.C. 1991) (stating that “[i]f our law per-
mitted the district attorney to exercise discretion as to when an aggravating circumstance 
supported by the evidence would or would not be submitted, our death penalty scheme would 
be arbitrary and, therefore, unconstitutional”); see also Kotch & Mosteller, supra note 21, at 
2079 (discussing the unique attempt of North Carolina to limit the discretion of prosecutors). 
 45. The legislature ultimately changed this requirement in 2001 by granting prosecu-
tors discretion to try a death eligible first-degree murder case without seeking the death pen-
alty. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2004 (2011). 
 46. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 277, 297 (1987) (explaining that “[b]ecause 
discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear 
proof before we would infer that the discretion has been abused,” and it therefore held that 
“the Baldus study is clearly insufficient to support an inference that any of the 
decisionmakers in McCleskey’s case acted with discriminatory purpose”). The current re-
gime not only permits but requires discretion. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) 
(requiring that capital sentencers be allowed to consider a “full range” of mitigating factors 
before determining the proper sentence). 
 47. HAINES, supra note 17, at 76 (documenting the frustration among movement 
activists and lawyers); see also Justice Harry Blackman famously declared in his dissent 
from a denial of writ of certiorari: 
Twenty years have passed since this Court declared that the death penalty must be 
imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all, . . . despite the effort 
of the States and courts to devise legal formulas and procedural rules to meet this 
daunting challenge, the death penalty remains fraught with arbitrariness, discrimi-
nation, caprice, and mistake. 
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While the movement continued to be dominated largely by a litigation 
strategy, it began to focus more directly on challenges to the influence of 
race.48 Litigators recognized that changes in the courts and the political cli-
mate after Furman in the late 1970s and early 1980s made litigation a more 
difficult avenue for reform.49 They believed, nonetheless, that compelling 
empirical evidence might support a successful Eighth Amendment chal-
lenge.50 At this time, Professor David Baldus and his colleagues at the Uni-
versity of Iowa had begun preliminary work on the impact of Furman on 
death eligibility in Georgia.51 The LDF asked them to conduct a second 
study on the role of race and helped secure funding for the study (the Baldus 
Study).52 
The Baldus Study represented the state of the art in statistical methods 
for isolating the role of race in the complex arena of capital murder cases.53 
Yet, when presented in McCleskey with strong statistical evidence that deci-
sion makers in Georgia’s capital sentencing system were indeed influenced 
by the race of the victim, the Court demurred.54 The Court again acknowl-
edged that consideration of improper factors is always a risk when decision 
makers have discretion.55 But given the important role discretion plays in 
our system, the Court required “exceptionally clear proof” before it would 
infer that discretion had been abused and the Constitution had been violat-
ed.56 
To the Court, “exceptionally clear proof” meant direct evidence from 
the defendant’s own case of decision makers’ discriminatory purpose.57 
Showing that the statutory scheme had a racially disparate impact would 
establish a constitutional violation only if the defendant proved that the leg-
  
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143-44 (1994). 
 48. HAINES, supra note 17, at 76. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 76-77. 
 51. David C. Baldus, George Woodworth & Charles A. Pulaski, Jr., Equal Justice 
and the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis 43-44 (1990) (explaining the Proce-
dural Reform Study). 
 52. Id. at 44-46 (introducing the Charging and Sentencing Study). 
 53. Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the 
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1399-1400 (1988) (summarizing reviews of the 
Baldus study by leading scholars and researchers who praised the study methodology calling 
it “‘the most complete and thorough analysis of sentencing that[ has] ever been done’” and 
“‘among the best empirical studies on criminal sentencing ever conducted’” (alteration in 
original) (citations omitted)); Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 52 (urging that new statewide 
charging and sentencing studies “should come as close as possible to being as comprehensive 
and meticulous as the Baldus team’s Georgia studies”). 
 54. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 (1987) (denying McCleskey’s appeal). 
 55. Id. at 297. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 297-98. 
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islature enacted or maintained it “because of an anticipated racially discrim-
inatory effect.”58 
The Court’s ruling in McCleskey signaled an abrupt end to the litiga-
tion strategy that had dominated death penalty abolition and criminal justice 
reform since the 1960s.59 Movement activists recognized the costs of the 
narrow litigation strategy and directed efforts more broadly.60 McCleskey 
may even have galvanized the grassroots movement.61 
McCleskey’s impact, however, reached far beyond the community of 
death penalty activists. McCleskey not only failed to advance a reform 
agenda, it virtually eliminated the possibility of using empirical evidence in 
challenging the role of race in capital punishment or in the criminal justice 
system as a whole.62 Justice Powell’s opinion suggested that race discrimi-
nation may be “inevitable, widespread, and ineradicable” and, therefore, 
“must be tolerated to retain the benefits of capital punishment.”63 If this dis-
crimination is to be tolerated in McCleskey, then “race discrimination in 
matters less momentous than life or death can be shrugged off.”64 As a re-
sult, the decision “insulat[ed] systemic racial discrimination from attack”65 
and stymied challenges to race discrimination in other areas of law.66 
B. Back to Basics: A More Incremental Approach to Reform 
The RJA is one of a long series of reforms to the North Carolina death 
penalty regime that a broad alliance of activists and lawyers advanced and 
implemented. For example, this group of activists advocated ground break-
ing reforms to indigent defense generally and capital defense in particular.67 
As discussed below, just as McCleskey contrasts with the RJA, the North 
  
 58. Id. at 298. 
 59. HAINES, supra note 17, at 78. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 79 (noting that movement activists began to use the McCleskey decision as 
an organizing tool among minority organizations). 
 62. Jeffrey Fagan & Mukul Bakhshi, New Frameworks for Racial Equality in the 
Criminal Law, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 7 (2007) (summarizing studies on the impact 
of race in drug enforcement, police-citizen encounters, and sentencing laws). 
 63. Baldus, Woodworth & Grosso, supra note 5, at 146 (citing Justice Powell’s 
opinion and a memorandum Justice Scalia circulated to the Court while the case was pend-
ing). 
 64. Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 47. 
 65. Theodore M. Shaw, Maintaining Hope in the Struggle Against the Constitutional 
Tolerance of Race Discrimination, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 59, 59 (2007). 
 66. Fagan & Bakhshi, supra note 62, at 7 (summarizing studies on the impact of 
race in drug enforcement, police-citizen encounters, and sentencing laws). 
 67. See generally Alexa Woodward, It Takes a Village to Save a Life: A Statewide 
Model for Indigent Capital Defense, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 159 (2007). 
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Carolina model for achieving reform contrasts sharply with the McCleskey-
era litigation strategy. 
The RJA opens by declaring, “No person shall be subject to or given a 
sentence of death or shall be executed pursuant to any judgment that was 
sought or obtained on the basis of race.”68 A defendant may establish a 
claim by showing that race was “a significant factor in decisions to seek or 
impose the sentence of death in the county, the prosecutorial district, the 
judicial division, or the State at the time the death sentence was sought or 
imposed.”69 The term “significant factor” does not have an established 
meaning in North Carolina law or practice, but may be distinguished from a 
requirement that race be the sole factor or even a primary one.70 The Act 
expressly subjects both local and statewide decision making to its terms.71 
By using the conjunction “or” in the list of possible geographic breadth, the 
Act requires only a finding that race was a significant factor in decisions in 
any one of the geographical areas.72 
The RJA expressly identifies statistical evidence as a type of evidence 
that is “relevant” to establishing a claim under the Act.73 Such a claim may 
be for discrimination in charging or sentencing decisions on the basis of 
race of the defendant or race of the victim, or discrimination in the exercise 
of peremptory challenges during jury selection.74 The claim must assert that 
the discrimination can be documented “irrespective of statutory factors.”75 
The defendant has the burden of proving that race was a significant 
factor in decision making, and the state may offer evidence in rebuttal, in-
cluding evidence of programs intended “to eliminate race as a factor in 
seeking or imposing a sentence of death.”76 
The legislative debate surrounding the RJA makes clear that the North 
Carolina General Assembly intended to take up the issue punted to them by 
  
 68. N.C. GEN. STAT § 15A-2010 (2011). 
 69. § 15A-2011(b) (emphasis added).  
 70. KENNY ROSE & HENDERSON HILL, THE RACIAL JUSTICE ACT: A STATUTORY 
ANALYSIS 2 (on file with authors). The Kentucky Racial Justice Action, by comparison, 
requires that the defendant prove “by clear and convincing evidence that race was the basis 
of the decision to seek the death penalty [in his or her case].” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
532.300(5) (West 2011) (emphasis added). 
 71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2011(a). 
 72. Id. 
 73. § 15A-2011(b). 
 74. Id. The undefined phrase “statutory factors” seems to refer to the elements of the 
crime and the system for identifying aggravators and mitigators and assigning punishment 
provided in the North Carolina criminal code. See § 14-17 (defining murder in the first and 
second degree); § 15A-2000 (codifying statutory aggravators and mitigators, and proceed-
ings to determine sentence in capital cases). 
 75. § 15A-2011(b). 
 76. § 15A-2011(c). 
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the McCleskey Court.77 The RJA is innovative in that it allows for the use of 
statistical evidence to uncover racial bias even when the bias is hidden or 
driven by psychological processes other than simple animus. When racism 
is overt, discriminatory purpose can sometimes be proved through direct 
evidence.78 But in modern times, it is much more likely to operate covertly 
and even outside the conscious awareness of the decision maker.79 Moreo-
ver, bias may not be driven by racial animus, but by greater empathy with 
certain victims. In other words, decision makers displaying racial bias may 
have no ill will toward people of certain races, but may simply put more 
value on the lives of people with whom they more closely identify.80 
As noted above, the RJA also authorizes relief based on a showing 
that “[r]ace was a significant factor in decisions to exercise peremptory 
challenges during jury selection.”81 In so doing, the RJA addresses not only 
the problem the McCleskey Court refused to face, but also the one the Court 
tried but by most accounts failed to fix in Batson v. Kentucky, that of racial 
discrimination in jury selection.82 Batson has been criticized as providing a 
toothless remedy against racially motivated strikes in jury selection because 
of the ease with which a claim can be rebutted. The challenged party need 
only provide a race neutral reason for the contested decision to strike.83 
  
 77. Kotch & Mosteller, supra note 21, at 2112-13 (quoting North Carolina Senator 
Doug Berger setting out the differences between McCleskey and the proposed Racial Justice 
Act). For an analysis of the RJA’s evidentiary requirements, see Robert P. Mosteller, 10 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1991477 (pp. 16-27). 
 78. For instance, Kenneth Rouse, an African American man, presented evidence that 
a juror who voted to convict and sentence him to death deliberately hid his animus toward 
African Americans in order to serve on Rouse’s jury. See Brief of Appellant at 7, Rouse v. 
Lee, 339 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2011) (No. 01-12), 2001 WL 34690440. 
 79. See, e.g., Patricia G. Devine, Implicit Prejudice and Stereotyping: How Auto-
matic Are They? Introduction to the Special Section, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
757, 757 (2001) (reviewing research on implicit stereotyping and prejudice, in which racial 
bias can operate outside a person’s conscious intent or awareness); but see Gregory Mitchell 
& Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1023, 1023 (2006) (cautioning that implicit bias research is far from definitive in establishing 
that these unconscious biases manifest as tendencies to discriminate in real world settings). 
 80. Psychologists who study discrimination have found that bias does not always 
manifest as animus or negative feelings toward members of another group, but can instead 
lead to favoritism toward members of the in-group and lack of empathy for those in the out-
group. See Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Mapping the Racial Bias of the White Male Capital 
Juror: Jury Composition and the “Empathic Divide,” 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 69 (2011) (for a 
discussion of this research). 
 81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2011(b)(3). 
 82. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 83. Id. at 97. 
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Generating reasons for any particular strike decision is not difficult, and 
trial courts are often reluctant to find a proffered justification pretextual.84 
Although Batson advanced consciousness of the role that race contin-
ues to play in the criminal justice system, it shifted the presumed inquiry to 
the particular juror at issue in a claimant’s particular case.85 The Court has 
endorsed more systematic inquiries in recent years but has not considered 
whether empirical evidence of system wide discrimination can support a 
constitutional claim.86 When patterns of racial disparities in strike decisions 
are observed across many cases, however, a clearer picture emerges. By 
inviting review of the role of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges 
across cases (i.e., across the county, district, division, or state), the RJA not 
only goes where the McCleskey Court would not, it goes where the Batson 
Court—with its focus on use of peremptories in individual cases—could 
not.87 
Thus, the RJA opens the door slammed by McCleskey and creates a 
new opportunity to consider the role of race in capital punishment. Its sig-
nificance, however, lies not only in its text and the claims it supports, but in 
  
 84. See, e.g., Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme Court’s Utter 
Failure to Meet the Challenge of Discrimination in Jury Selection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 501, 
501 (asserting that “[o]nly the most overtly discriminatory or impolitic lawyer can be caught 
in Batson’s toothless bite”); Lance Koonce, Note, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. and the 
Fate of the Peremptory Challenge, 73 N.C. L. REV. 525, 560-61 (1995) (arguing that it is 
“likely that the peremptory will remain in place, damaged but still useful, and courts and 
litigators will do what they always do when confronted with new restrictions: adapt”). 
 85. Batson allowed the use of systematic evidence to establish a defendant’s prima 
facie case, but did not require it. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95-96 (1986) (dis-
cussing the use of system-wide evidence). Batson overturned Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 
202 (1965), which had required evidence of system wide discrimination to state a claim. 
 86. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005) (holding that the petitioner’s showing 
of discriminatory pattern in state’s race-neutral explanations as a whole warranted relief). 
Defendants have also sought to introduce a study on the role of race in the exercise of per-
emptory challenges in several cases in Philadelphia. See, e.g., Ford v. Digugliemo, No. 
Civ.A. 03-4336, 2004 WL 73961, at *4 n.7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2004) (citing David C. Baldus 
et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical 
Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3 (2001)); Holloway v. Horn, 161 F. Supp. 2d 452, 493 (E.D. 
Pa. 2001) (citing Baldus et al., supra), rev’d, 355 F.3d 707 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2011(b)(3) (2011). Analysis of strike information aggre-
gated across many cases allows for a clearer picture of the role of race than analysis of strike 
decisions in any one case. If, for instance, prosecutors tend to believe that housewives make 
bad jurors, and if being a housewife is unrelated to race (that is, people of one race are no 
more or less likely to be housewives than people of another race), then strike decisions moti-
vated by that factor should be evenly distributed across potential jurors of different races. 
The prosecutor who strikes a Black housewife would have done the same thing if the poten-
tial juror had been of a different race. Only by looking across cases can this be determined. 
The claimant can draw on thousands of strike decisions rather than the fourteen allotted in a 
North Carolina capital case to look at disparities in the use of peremptories against African-
Americans and control for alternative, race-neutral explanations of those decisions. 
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its impact on the social movement behind the RJA, and perhaps even more 
broadly, on North Carolina race politics. 
II. A CONFLUENCE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
Social movement scholars have suggested several factors associated 
with success. At a very basic level, the organization itself matters—how it is 
structured, its coalitions, its strategies in choosing issues on which to focus 
and how best to frame them.88 An important feature of success, however, is 
a social movement’s capacity to forge a common path among many strong 
independent movements.89 Three groups were responsible for propelling the 
RJA through the General Assembly: legislators, civil rights advocates, and 
death penalty reformers.90 Indeed, it was the confluence of efforts by these 
three groups that emerged as a unified social movement that led to the pas-
sage of the RJA. 
Representative Ronnie Sutton from Pembrook, North Carolina, first 
introduced a racial justice act in February 2001 as recommended by a Legis-
lative Research Commission.91 This bill passed through several committees 
before being “[p]ostponed [i]ndefinitely” in October 2002.92 In April 2007, 
Representatives Larry Womble and Earline Parmon from Forsythe re-
introduced the bill and lobbied in the legislature and around the state for its 
passage.93 When the bill died in Senate committee, Womble and Parmon 
  
 88. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A 
THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 35 (1978) (identifying internal characteristics 
of social movement organizations that affect their ability to effect legal reform, such as size 
and funding); Edward L. Rubin, Passing through the Door: Social Movement Literature and 
Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 29-32 (2001). 
 89. J. Craig Jenkins, Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Move-
ments, 9 ANN. REV. SOC. 527, 546 (1983). 
 90. Samiha Khanna, The Racial Justice Act: GOP Could Repeal or Amend Land-
mark Legislation: Legislative Preview, INDEP. WKLY. (Durham, N.C.), Jan. 26, 2011, 
http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/the-racial-justice-act-gop-could-repeal-or-amend-
landmark-legislation/Content?oid=1983591. 
 91. NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, HOUSE PRINCIPAL CLERK’S OFFICE, 
NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2009, at 15, available at 
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/DocumentSites/HouseDocuments/2009-2010%20Session/ 
2009%20Alphabetical%20List.pdf; Racial Justice Act, H.B. 140, 2001 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 
2001). 
 92. North Carolina General Assembly – House Bill 140 Information/History (2001-
2002 Session), N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/BillLookUp/ 
BillLookUp.pl?Session=2001&BillID=H+140&submitButton=Go (last visited July 16, 
2011). 
 93. N.C. Racial Justice Act, H.B. 1291, 2007 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2007); Press 
Release, Offices of Representative Larry Womble and Representative Earline Parmon, NC 
Senate Politics Kills Racial Justice Act for 2008; Battle Will Continue in 2009 (July 2008), 
available at http://carolinajustice.typepad.com/ncnaacp/2008/07/nc-senate-polit.html [here-
inafter Press Release, Womble & Parmon] (“The North Carolina Racial Justice Act was 
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issued a joint press release decrying the Senate for failing to bring the bill 
forward, and listing and lauding the bill’s “fearless advocates.”94 The press 
release concluded by promising,  
While the battle has been lost until the next legislative session, state legislators, the 
NC Legislative Black Caucus and numerous coalitions including the NC NAACP 
led coalition of eighty-five statewide progressive organizations will continue to 
fight for this vital legislation in a new and improved form in the next legislative 
session.95 
As promised, Representatives Womble and Parmon reintroduced the 
RJA in the North Carolina House of Representatives in March 2009.96 Sena-
tor Floyd McKissick Jr. of Durham introduced the bill in the Senate that 
same day.97 Womble, Parmon, and McKissick resumed lobbying for what 
they characterized as an essential civil rights bill that was “‘critically needed 
to correct any type of conduct that might be impermissible when it comes to 
the imposition of the death penalty.’”98 Representative Womble gave a 
“long, impassioned” speech in support of the bill on the floor of the House 
of Representatives.99 
The North Carolina Legislative Black Caucus provided important sup-
port to the bill in 2007 and 2009.100 In 2007, caucus chair Representative 
Alma Adams and other members of the caucus were expressly recognized 
for their support.101 The caucus selected Senator McKissick, the primary 
  
sponsored and championed by Forsyth county legislators, Representatives Larry Womble 
and Earline Parmon.”). 
 94. Press Release, Womble & Parmon, supra note 93; James Romoser, Session 
Finishes, Adjourns: Short Assembly May Be Best Recalled For What It Didn’t Do, WINSTON-
SALEM J., July 19, 2008, at Metro 1 (“In a highly unusual step, Womble and Parmon sent out 
a scathing press release on Thursday, blasting Senate Democrats for not passing the bill.”). 
 95. Press Release, Womble & Parmon, supra note 93. 
 96. North Carolina General Assembly – House Bill 472 Information/History (2009-
2010 Session), N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/BillLookUp/ 
BillLookUp.pl?Session=2009&BillID=H472 (last visited Nov. 4, 2011). 
 97. North Carolina General Assembly – Senate Bill 461 Information/History (2009-
2010 Session), N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/BillLookUp/ 
BillLookUp.pl?Session=2009&BillID=S461 (last visited Nov. 4, 2011). 
 98. James Romoser, Racial Justice Act Passes, Now Goes to Purdue, WINSTON-
SALEM J., Aug. 6, 2009, at 1 (quoting Sen. McKissick). 
 99. James Romoser, Racial Justice Bill Moves On: House Gives Tentative OK; 
Second Vote Scheduled for Today, WINTON-SALEM J., July 15, 2009, at 1. 
 100. Press Release, Womble & Parmon, supra note 93; Samiha Khanna, RJA Repeal 
Efforts: Bill to Erase Racial Justice Act Now Has A Half-Sister in the Senate, 
INDYWEEK.COM, May 18, 2001, available at http://m.indyweek.com/triangulator/archives 
/2011/05/18/rja-repeal-bill-to-erase-racial-justice-act-now-has-a-half-sister-in-the-senate (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2011). 
 101. Press Release, Womble & Parmon, supra note 93; Samiha Khanna, RJA Repeal 
Efforts: Bill to Erase Racial Justice Act Now Has A Half-Sister in the Senate, 
INDYWEEK.COM, May 18, 2001, available at http://m.indyweek.com/triangulator/archives 
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sponsor of the RJA in the Senate, to chair the caucus shortly after the bill’s 
passage.102 
Legislators repeatedly recognized the roles of two traditionally distinct 
social movements: the civil rights movement and the death penalty reform 
movement. Although the NAACP had played an important role in the aboli-
tionist movement through LDF, the anti-death penalty movement had diffi-
culty achieving racial or ideological diversity among their ranks.103 Move-
ment leaders had long recognized the importance of joining forces with civil 
rights groups, both because of the increased numbers offered by their rank 
and file and for the expertise they brought to the table.104 But anti-death 
penalty movement leaders were largely unsuccessful in their efforts to 
frame the death penalty in a way that resonated with civil rights organiza-
tions.105 
In contrast, the North Carolina NAACP not only worked with the 
death penalty movement to pass the RJA, it played a distinct and leading 
role in the joint RJA campaign.106 The confluence of these two movements 
around a common concern for racial justice may provide the strongest 
grounds for optimism about long-term prospects for the Act. In the next two 
sections we look at each movement in turn and consider how it approached 
this campaign. Each operates as a sophisticated social movement that has 
achieved a nuanced understanding of the interplay among social context, 
social mobilization, and legal reform. A closer look at these social move-
ments helps to explain both why the RJA passed and how it might impact 
North Carolina’s ability to confront the role of race in criminal justice. 
A. The Civil Rights Movement, Led by the North Carolina NAACP 
The North Carolina NAACP elected Reverend Doctor William J. Bar-
ber, II as its president in October 2005 after his successful challenge to in-
  
/2011/05/18/rja-repeal-bill-to-erase-racial-justice-act-now-has-a-half-sister-in-the-senate (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2011). 
 102. Samiha Khanna, McKissick Named Chairman of the N.C. Legislative Black 
Caucus, INDEP. WKLY. (Durham, N.C.), Feb. 2, 2011, http://www.indyweek.com/triangulator 
/archives/2011/02/02/mckissick-named-chairman-of-nc-legislative-black-caucus (an article 
on McKissick’s selection as chairman tied his work on the RJA to his selection, noting, “He 
is well known for his work in 2009 to sponsor and win support for the N.C. Racial Justice 
Act”). 
 103. HAINES, supra note 17, at 111-16 (discussing the difficulty anti-death penalty 
organizations faced in attracting the attention of civil rights groups). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Press Release, Womble & Parmon, supra note 93 (identifying the North Caroli-
na NAACP as having “led [a] coalition of eighty-five statewide progressive organizations”). 
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cumbent Melvin “Skip” Alston.107 The two candidates campaigned on dif-
ferent visions of the NAACP’s role.108 Alston, a businessman who held the 
title since 1996,109 asserted that the presence of elected black officials in 
government meant that the NAACP could and should pursue its agenda by 
working with state legislators.110 Rev. Dr. Barber presented himself in stark 
contrast: “‘The people want the NAACP to be an out-front, not a behind-
the-scenes, organization that speaks clearly.’”111 
Rev. Dr. Barber took his election as a mandate to energize the North 
Carolina NAACP and to engage the movement in ways that resonated with 
social movement theory. Rev. Dr. Barber cultivated broad partnerships with 
a diverse group of organizations working for social and civil rights.112 As 
noted above, scholars recognize that a social movement’s capacity to forge 
a common path among independent movements is an indicator of success.113 
Rev. Dr. Barber argues, “We had to be smart enough to come together and 
at least have a working relationship and a common agenda that . . . provides 
a platform for us to use our collective strength to push for fundamental 
change.”114 
This coalition, led by Rev. Dr. Barber and the North Carolina 
NAACP, identified a broad agenda for advancing social and civil rights in 
North Carolina. The 14-point People’s Agenda for North Carolina promoted 
by the North Carolina NAACP’s HKonJ movement reflects the breadth of 
the work.115 The agenda encompasses education reform, fair wages, access 
to health care, securing voting rights, and affordable housing.116 This broad 
  
 107. Mark Binker, NAACP Replaces Alston as President, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., 
Oct. 9, 2005, at A1. 
 108. Jim Nesbitt, NAACP to Tackle Issues Upfront, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, 
N.C.), Nov. 6, 2005, at B3. 
 109. Binker, supra note 107. 
 110. Nesbitt, supra note 108. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Lori Wiggins, Rev. William Barber: The Gospel Truth, THE CRISIS, Winter 2011, 
at 42. 
 113. J. Craig Jenkins, Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Move-
ments, 9 ANN. REV. SOC. 527, 546 (1983). 
 114. Wiggins, supra note 112. 
 115. HKonJ stands for Historic Thousands on Jones Street, the street that passes in 
front of the North Carolina General Assembly. Welcome to Our Online Community, HKONJ, 
http://carolinajustice.typepad.com/hkonj/2007/09/welcome-to-our-.html (last visited July 20, 
2011). HKonJ “began in 2007 as an effort to create a grassroots movement in support of a 
14-point progressive agenda in connection with a rally and march on the state legislative 
building on Jones Street in downtown Raleigh.” Id. It is an ongoing coalition of nearly 100 
organizations to support progressive causes in North Carolina. Id. 
 116. About Us: Our 14-Point Agenda, HKONJ, http://carolinajustice.typepad.com 
/hkonj/about_us/ (last visited July 20, 2011). 
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agenda provided a platform for activists to “connect[] the dots between their 
own organization’s issues and the others on the list of 14.”117 
Social movement scholars have documented the importance of fram-
ing for maintaining this kind of broad mobilization.118 A frame is an inter-
pretive scheme defining a problem and making the case for specific changes 
to rectify it.119 To succeed, a social movement’s leaders must package their 
ideas in a way that “push[es] the right buttons” by resonating with existing 
beliefs and values.120 In that sense, social movement organizers are “con-
sumers of existing cultural meanings and producers of new meanings.”121 In 
a complex coalition like this, framing takes place at both the organizational 
level and at a movement wide level.122 
The People’s Agenda provided a frame that redefined the way that 
very diverse movements saw each other and their role in North Carolina 
politics.123 Rev. Dr. Barber and other leaders launched the agenda with a 
“teach in” and rally in front of the General Assembly for 2,000 activists 
from across the state.124 The goal was to reach potential participants in all 
100 North Carolina counties and to involve every possible organization.125 
An important question, however, was whether the framing that supported 
the march and rally could support a movement, rather than a single event.126 
Rev. Dr. Barber’s vision may have been tested for the first time during 
the 2008 presidential election. In early 2007, not long after the HKonJ rally, 
the movement committed to working in broad coalition to pass same-day 
voting and early voting laws.127 The coalition engaged in this campaign and 
  
 117. Bob Geary, HK on J ‘Teach-In’ Draws 2,000 to Raleigh, INDEP. WKLY., Feb. 14, 
2007, at 12. The HKonJ website lists 79 coalition partners. Partners for HKonJ, 
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 118. David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Master Frames and Cycles of Protest, in 
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N.C.), Feb. 11, 2007, at B1. 
 124. Geary, supra note 117; DeConto, supra note 123. 
 125. Geary, supra note 117. 
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 127. The coalition also included (at least) the Institute for Civic Engagement and 
Social Change (ICESC) at North Carolina Central University, Democracy North Carolina, 
North Carolina Common Cause, and Blueprint NC. Jarvis A. Hall, The Campus, the Commu-
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Blue, THE CRISIS, Spring 2009, at 48. 
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North Carolina passed laws providing “one-stop [absentee] voting site[s]” 
where eligible voters could register and cast a provisional ballot in response 
to this initiative.128 North Carolina was the only southern state to make these 
changes.129 In addition to working for legislative reform, the coalition initi-
ated other campaigns intended to increase voting among African American 
and other minority communities (in which voting had traditionally been 
low).130 The North Carolina NAACP provided a strong grassroots network 
to the coalition “with the wherewithal to do mass mobilizations and entrée 
to communities throughout the state.”131 
The campaigns all focused on the importance of and meaningful ac-
cess to voting. The North Carolina NAACP trained community leaders 
across the state, launched a series of statewide radio campaigns, distributed 
internet and YouTube messages, and sent hundreds of thousands of robo-
calls targeting traditional non-voters.132 The North Carolina NAACP orga-
nized the “Millions Voting March” and the “Souls to the Polls” initiative 
focused on getting out the vote.133 Movement leaders made contingency 
plans for election day and intervened to extend voting hours and resolve 
registration issues when needed.134 In other words, the coalition conducted a 
broad based traditional grassroots campaign to get out the vote. And, the 
campaign succeeded. According to the North Carolina State Board of Elec-
tions, the state had the highest percent of the voting age population regis-
tered and highest turnout of registered voters since 1972.135 More than 1.2 
  
 128. The registration was to be validated and the ballot included in the election within 
two days of the registration. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-82.6A (2011); see also Cash Michaels, 
NAACP Pres. Jealous Endorses NC’s ‘Millions Voting March,’ N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, 
Oct. 9, 2008, at 4 (noting that the new voting law came about “‘[a]s a result of the diligent 
work of the NAACP in North Carolina and its coalition partners’”). 
 129. Wiggins, supra note 127. 
 130. See id. at 48-49 (describing the targeted populations); Kristen Collins, NAACP 
Urges N.C. to Set Example for Nation, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 11, 2008, at 
B5 (reporting on the North Carolina state NAACP annual convention and noting that North 
Carolina was a “key part of the [NAACP]’s efforts to bring historic numbers of black voters 
to the poles”). 
 131. Hall, supra note 127, at 44. 
 132. Wiggins, supra note 127, at 49 (describing the programs); Hall, supra note 127, 
at 45 (describing the programs and significant role of individual coalition partners in the 
programs); Michaels, supra note 128, at 4 (describing the breadth of programs). 
 133. Michaels, supra note 128, at 4 (providing detailed description of many different 
ways organizations participated in the Millions Voting March); Wiggins, supra note 127, at 
48-49 (describing the Millions Voting March and Souls to the Polls); Hall, supra note 127, at 
45 (same). 
 134. Wiggins, supra note 127, at 49. 
 135. Statistics for Presidential Election Years, 1972 – 2004, N.C. ST. BD. OF 
ELECTIONS, http://www.sboe.state.nc.us/content.aspx?ID=70 (last visited July 20, 2011); see 
also Hall, supra note 127, at 43 (“In 2008, . . . North Carolina led the nation with the biggest 
increase in voter turnout over 2004, from 64 percent to 70 percent.”).  
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million minority voters participated in the 2008 presidential election in 
North Carolina.136 
The North Carolina state conference of the NAACP received prestig-
ious national awards at the 99th Annual NAACP Convention in 2008 partly 
for its work on voter empowerment.137 The broad and diverse coalition part-
ners contributed a great deal to the success of the voter campaign.138 So too, 
however, did the careful framing of the issues by the North Carolina 
NAACP and its partners. As demonstrated above, the coalition recognized 
the diverse constituencies for the voter empowerment campaign and framed 
the issue appropriately—from catchy names (“Souls to Polls”) and specific 
instructions (for example, instructing student voters to allow elderly voters 
to vote first and to escort them to the polls, offering an arm, if needed), to a 
broad use of longstanding civil rights messages around voters’ rights. As 
one historian of race and social movements in North Carolina noted, Rev. 
Dr. Barber “‘built a statewide interracial fusion political coalition that has 
not been seriously attempted since 1900.’”139 
The North Carolina NAACP brought its expertise as a sophisticated 
social movement with a strong leader committed to broad coalitions to the 
RJA campaign. Point 9 on the 14-Point plan called for the abolition of the 
“racially biased” death penalty.140 People of Faith Against the Death Penal-
ty, led by Steven Dear, had been involved in Rev. Dr. Barber’s coalition 
since its earliest days.141 As noted above, Rev. Dr. Barber and the North 
Carolina state chapter of the NAACP supported the racial justice act in 
2007.142 In 2007 and 2008, the movement efficiently energized and mobi-
lized its members around the presidential campaign. When Representatives 
Womble and Parmon introduced the racial justice act in the house in March 
2009, the NAACP was in top shape for action. The issues of “racial justice” 
fit well with the minority rights aspects of the voting campaign and with the 
civil rights message of the movement. 
C. The Death Penalty Reform Movement 
A second diverse coalition of non-governmental organizations loosely 
organized under the North Carolina Coalition for a Moratorium (“NCCM”) 
  
 136. Wiggins, supra note 127, at 49. 
 137. North Carolina Conference of NAACP Honored at National Convention, NEWS 
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 31, 2008, at B2. 
 138. Hall, supra note 127, at 43-44 (explaining the roles of different coalition part-
ners). 
 139. Wiggins, supra note 112 (quoting Duke University historian Tim Tyson). 
 140. About Us: Our 14-Point Agenda, supra note 116. 
 141. DeConto, supra note 123. 
 142. Press Release, Womble & Parmon, supra note 93 (identifying the North Caroli-
na NAACP as having “led” a coalition of eighty-five statewide progressive organizations). 
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played a significant role in organizing the RJA movement.143 NCCM is “a 
partnership of organizations and individuals across the state that supports 
reforms to [North Carolina’s] capital punishment system.”144 Not all organi-
zations active in capital punishment reform belong to NCCM but many, if 
not most, do. We focus primarily on NCCM for ease of reference. Many 
coalition partners—including the North Carolina NAACP—played signifi-
cant leadership roles in the RJA campaign and other reforms.145 Coalition 
partners’ members provide the grassroots connections that power the 
movement. 
NCCM expressly seeks a moratorium on executions (but not capital 
prosecutions) while the state institutes reforms to capital punishment.146 Our 
understanding of the coalition is as a meeting place for equals rather than a 
hierarchical movement on its own. NCCM facilitates and informs strategy 
discussions, but does not dictate strategy.147 
As noted above, social movements are most likely to succeed when 
they form broad coalitions. The NCCM has been more successful in achiev-
ing this than abolitionist movements of the past.148 NCCM maintained an 
impressively broad membership during the RJA campaign. Its website lists 
“partnership profiles” including advocacy, faith based, legal, and victim 
outreach.149 Some of these alliances seem quite natural. For instance, the 
  
 143. Partner Profiles, N.C. COALITION FOR A MORATORIUM, http://www.ncmora 
torium.org/partnerprofiles.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2011). 
 144. North Carolina Coalition for a Moratorium, N.C. ACTION NETWORK, http://nc 
actionnet.org/organizations/?id=1298 (last visited June 16, 2011). 
 145. The coalition typically has one or two staff members. In contrast, many coalition 
partners support much larger staffs. 
 146. Why North Carolina Needs a Moratorium on Executions, N.C. COALITION FOR A 
MORATORIUM, http://www.ncmoratorium.org/Issues.aspx?li=394 (last visited Sept. 20, 
2011). NCCM advocates for reforms to minimize the possibility of wrongful convictions, the 
role of race in capital punishment, and the arbitrary nature of the death penalty. Id. 
 147. Personal conversations with coalition members. 
 148. The NCCM seeks a moratorium rather than complete abolition of capital pun-
ishment, but the abolitionist movement is nevertheless relevant here. The NCCM began as an 
abolitionist group under the name North Carolinians Against the Death Penalty, and clearly 
there is substantial overlap between the two movements in that they share a goal of ending 
the death penalty in its current form. 
 149. Partner Profiles, supra note 143. The NCCM website lists its partners and pro-
vides links to each organization’s webpage (if available). Under “Advocacy,” it lists Carolina 
Justice Policy Center, North Carolina Black Leadership Caucus, ACLU of North Carolina, 
ACLU Capital Punishment Project, Amnesty International, Charlotte Community Justice 
Coalition, Gaston Coalition for a Moratorium Now, NAACP North Carolina, National Asso-
ciation of Social Workers-North Carolina, and North Carolina League of Women Voters. 
Advocacy, N.C. COALITION FOR A MORATORIUM, http://www.ncmoratorium.org/advocacy. 
aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2011). Under “Faith-based,” it lists Franciscan Coalition for Justice 
and Peace, North Carolina Council of Churches, and People of Faith against the Death Penal-
ty. Faith Based Organizations, N.C. COALITION FOR A MORATORIUM, http://www.ncmorato 
rium.org/faithorgs.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2011). Under “Legal,” it lists Center for Death 
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coalition includes the Carolina Justice Policy Center, an organization com-
mitted to reforming sentencing practices generally and the death penalty in 
particular,150 and the North Carolina chapter of the American Civil Liberties 
Union.151 It also includes groups not so obviously associated with death 
penalty reform. For instance, the National Association of Social Workers–
North Carolina is a coalition member that “seeks to enhance the effective 
functioning and well being of individuals, families, and communities 
through its work and advocacy.”152 Its legislative agenda seeks to advance 
child welfare initiatives, increase access to health care, and expand the 
availability of eldercare.153 The organization does not deal directly with the 
criminal justice system or criminal justice reform. Similarly, the coalition 
includes the League of Women Voters of North Carolina, an organization 
primarily focused on activities such as campaign and election reform, access 
to voting, and voter education.154 
The coalition also invited support for its campaign from “prominent 
North Carolinians” and received an endorsement from “a diverse and bipar-
tisan group of North Carolina citizens,” including former elected leaders, 
retired judges, university trustees, former district attorneys, and religious 
leaders.155 This broad coalition involved multiple constituencies in the RJA 
campaign. 
An essential part of NCCM’s success derives from its ability to identi-
fy a successful master frame. NCCM’s work in the last ten years suggests a 
  
Penalty Litigation, Fair Trial Initiative, North Carolina Advocates for Justice, and North 
Carolina Association of Women Attorneys. Legal, N.C. COALITION FOR A MORATORIUM, 
http://www.ncmoratorium.org/Legal.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2011). Under “Victim Out-
reach,” it lists Capital Restorative Justice Project and Murder Victims’ Families for Recon-
ciliation. Victim Outreach, N.C. COALITION FOR A MORATORIUM, http://www.nc moratori-
um.org/VictimOutreach.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2011). Finally, NCCM includes a coalition 
from the western part of the state, the Western North Carolina Coalition for a Moratorium 
Partners. Western North Carolina Coalition for a Moratorium, N.C. COALITION FOR A 
MORATORIUM, http://www.ncmoratorium.org/WNCCM.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2011). This 
coalition includes Asheville Friends Peace and Earth, Gaston Coalition for a Moratorium, 
Charlotte Coalition for a Moratorium Now, The Ethical Society of Asheville, UNC-Asheville 
Chapter of ACLU, UNC-Asheville Chapter of Amnesty International, UNC-Asheville Psi 
Chi, Unitarian Universalist Church of Asheville, Western Carolinians for Criminal Justice, 
and Western North Carolina ACLU. Id. 
 150. CAROLINA JUST. POL’Y CENT., http://www.justicepolicycenter.org/ (last visited 
June 13, 2011). 
 151. ACLU OF N.C., http://www.acluofnorthcarolina.org (last visited June 13, 2011). 
 152. About NASW-NC, N.A.S.W.-N.C., http://www.naswnc.org/displaycommon 
.cfm?an=2 (last visited June 16, 2011). 
 153. 2011 Legislative Agenda, N.A.S.W.-N.C., http://www.naswnc.org/display com-
mon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=29 (last visited June 16, 2011). 
 154. See generally LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF N.C., http://www.rtpnet.org/ 
~lwvnc/ (last visited June 16, 2011). 
 155. Letter to Michael F. Easley, James B. Black & Marc Basnight (Apr. 25, 2005), 
available at http://www.ncmoratorium.org/support.aspx. 
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keen awareness of the power of framing. NCCM was founded in 1965, un-
der the name “North Carolinians Against the Death Penalty.”156 In 2003, it 
changed its name to the “North Carolina Coalition for a Moratorium,”157 as 
part of a national effort to re-frame, and re-energize, the anti-death penalty 
movement.158 Much like the “Nuclear Freeze” frame energized the peace 
movement in the 1980s, the moratorium movement built on widespread 
concerns about wrongful convictions to enlist new members to what was 
now seen as a reform movement and to energize long time abolitionists.159  
Rather than standing against something, the coalition now offered the 
affirmative, and perhaps more broadly politically palatable, solution of a 
moratorium.160 Potential supporters of a moratorium need not oppose capital 
punishment in principle; they need only support reform. Popular support for 
a moratorium has been shown to be strong, notwithstanding similarly strong 
support for capital punishment. A 2004 poll showed that sixty-three percent 
of North Carolina residents surveyed supported implementing a moratorium 
on executions to provide time for the state to study its capital punishment 
system. 161 
This frame resonated broadly across many coalition partners. Several 
coalition partners adopted similar names.162 Others modified their message 
to be consistent with this goal. For example, the website of the Carolina 
  
 156. Death Penalty Opponents Remain Vigilant, THE CARRBORO CITIZEN, June 12, 
2008, http://www.carrborocitizen.com/main/2008/06/12/death-penalty-opponents-remain-
vigilant/; Jeremy Collins, Reforming Capital Punishment in the South: A Glimpse at the 
North Carolina Racial Justice Act Movement: Address at the “Moving Beyond ‘Racial 
Blindsight’?” Symposium, April 8, 2011, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 447. 
 157. Death Penalty Opponents Remain Vigilant, supra note 156; Collins, supra note 
156. 
 158. Patrick O’Neill, Moratorium Leader Sees Hope for End of Death Penalty, NAT’L 
CATH. REP., Jan. 19, 2001, at 7 (explaining how coalition partner Stephen Dear, Executive 
Director of People of Faith Against the Death Penalty, learned about the “moratorium” and 
“reform” frame at a national meeting and introduced the idea to his board in North Carolina); 
see also Snow & Benford, supra note 118, at 140-41 (stating that a frame has greater mobi-
lizing potential when it rings true to the experience of the targets of mobilization). 
 159. Snow & Benford, supra note 118, at 143 (using the Nuclear Freeze movement as 
an example of a successful master frame). 
 160. Darren Freeman, Legislators Rework Bill on Death Penalty Moratorium, 
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, June 17, 2005, at Y1.  
 161. Id. A poll conducted in 2005 found that sixty-four percent of the state’s popula-
tion supported the death penalty. Gary L. Wright, N.C. Takes Aim at Bias in Death Penalty, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 12, 2009, available at http://www.eji.org/eji/files/08.12.09%20 
Charlotte%20Observer%20-%20NC%20takes%20aim%20at%20bias%20in%20dp.pdf. 
 162. GASTON COALITION FOR A MORATORIUM NOW AND CHARLOTTE COALITION FOR A 
MORATORIUM, http://www.charlottejustice.org/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2011) (now Charlotte 
Community Justice Coalition); see also Our Partners, NORTH CAROLINA COALITION FOR A 
MORATORIUM, http://www.ncmoratorium.org/partners.aspx (last visited Jan. 26, 2012). 
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Justice Policy Center advances a “cooling off period” in the form of a mora-
torium in order to undertake necessary reforms.163 
Much of the social movement literature posits tension between grass-
roots advocates and legal advocates.164 Lawyers are seen as hired guns who 
take over decision making about the movement’s goals and strategies.165 
Litigation-based strategies, such as the ones that supported McCleskey, have 
been challenged not only as ineffective, but counterproductive.166 NCCM, 
however, has managed to strike a balance between the roles of grassroots 
activists and litigators. It frames the movement as one for legal reform and 
includes lawyers and non-profit law firms as coalition members. 
The lawyers and law firm members are coalition partners rather than 
primary decision makers as they were in the earlier litigation campaign. 
They do not present themselves as directing or leading the coalition.167 The 
legal advocacy groups, such as the non-profit law firm the Center for Death 
Penalty Litigation (CDPL)168 and the Fair Trial Initiative,169 are themselves 
  
 163. See THE CAROLINA JUSTICE POLICY CTR., AREAS OF DEATH PENALTY REFORM, 
available at http://www.justicepolicycenter.org/Articles%20and%20Research/Research/ 
Death%20Penalty/CJPC_Reform_Position.pdf; see also Death Penalty, ACLU OF N.C., 
http://www.aclu. org/human-rights/death-penalty (“The ACLU Capital Punishment Project is 
fighting for the end of the death penalty by supporting moratorium and repeal movements 
through public education and advocacy. We are engaged in systemic reform of the death 
penalty process, and case-specific litigation highlighting some of its fundamental flaws.”). 
 164. See Scott Barclay, Lynn C. Jones & Anna-Maria Marshall, Two Spinning 
Wheels: Studying Law and Social Movements, 54 STUD. L., POL., & SOC’Y 1, 8 (noting the 
ubiquity of criticism among social movement scholars of legal strategies because “they rely 
on elite intervention and deplete scarce movement resources, thus sapping the strength of 
more grassroots mobilization”). 
 165. A movement to reform capital punishment may be categorically different from 
movements for pay equity or gay rights in that capital punishment exists only through the 
law and the legal system. Changing the law may be itself the end, rather than one means to 
an end. If this is true, lawyers would have a more natural role to play than in other move-
ments. But NCCM seeks to reform rather than abolish the death penalty. It may not be the 
case that legal mobilization can achieve these reforms. 
 166. For instance, public support for the death penalty was in decline in the late 
1960s but rose dramatically following the Furman decision. While many factors likely con-
tributed to that shift, backlash against the Furman decision may have been a factor. HAINES, 
supra note 17, at 22, 44-46 (discussing the shift in the anti-death penalty movement’s strate-
gy in the 1960s and 70s from traditional grassroots activism targeted at persuading the public 
and lawmakers to end capital punishment, to one led by litigators with LDF and the ACLU 
seeking to end the death penalty through test case litigation directly challenging its constitu-
tionality). 
 167. Authors’ conversations with attorneys involved in NCCM. 
 168. CENTER FOR DEATH PENALTY LITIGATION, http://www.cdpl.org/index.html (last 
visited June 13, 2011). CDPL describes itself as “a non-profit law firm located in Durham, 
North Carolina. Our staff includes lawyers, social workers, mitigation investigators, public 
information officers, and paralegals. Together, we provide direct representation to death 
sentenced inmates of North Carolina’s death row and consultation assistance to virtually 
every lawyer practicing capital litigation in the state.” Id. 
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part of the coalition, just like the faith-based or victims’ rights groups. 
Many of the lawyers working with NCCM represent capital defendants and 
consider this their first and foremost role.170 The attorneys’ involvement in 
capital trials and appeals gives them a particular expertise that they, in turn, 
can assert in coalition meetings. 
Additionally, NCCM seeks to reform capital punishment primarily by 
embracing incremental reform in the capital punishment system.171 Most of 
the reforms are, in fact, changes to the law of capital punishment in North 
Carolina. For example, NCCM worked to pass legislation preventing the 
execution of the mentally retarded in North Carolina in 2001,172 a year be-
fore the Supreme Court held the practice unconstitutional. 173 
The extent to which NCCM deliberately used direct litigation as a 
means to advance reform is less clear. There appear to be some cases in 
which the coalition may have encouraged this approach. For example, the 
lawyers and law firm coalition partners challenged North Carolina’s use of 
lethal injection on multiple grounds between 2005 and 2011.174 The success 
of these interventions created a de facto moratorium, and therefore support-
ed the NCCM’s primary objective.175 Certainly the litigation would not have 
been seen to be at odds with the long term goals. At the least it created an 
opportunity for other reforms, like the RJA, to advance. It seems likely to 
have appeared on the agenda at coalition partner meetings. 
  
 169. FAIR TRIAL INITIATIVE, www.fairtrial.org (last visited Sept. 15, 2011). The Fair 
Trial Initiative (FTI) works “to ensure fairness for indigent defendants facing the death pen-
alty” by “recruiting and training lawyers and other professionals to assist with representation 
in individual cases; promoting a multidisciplinary approach and teamwork in capital defense; 
and continuously introducing innovative approaches to the defense of death penalty cases. 
FTI also promotes reform through public education.” Id.; About Us, FAIR TRIAL INITIATIVE, 
http://www.fairtrial.org/about.php (last visited Sept. 15, 2011).  
 170. Typically, litigators engage less in abolitionist work and more in the “more 
modest task of saving the lives of their clients one by one rather than as a class.” HAINES, 
supra note 17, at 118. 
 171. Reforms to Consider During a Temporary Delay of Executions, N.C. COALITION 
FOR A MORATORIUM, http://www.ncmoratorium.org/Issues.aspx?li=537 (last visited June 22, 
2011). 
 172. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2011). 
 173. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 174. See, e.g., Appellants’ Brief, Conner v. Council of State, No. 213PA10, 2011 WL 
4636587 (N.C. Oct. 7, 2011), 2010 WL 4734110, available at http://deathwatch.files. 
wordpress.com/2011/03/10-11-8-appellants-brief.pdf. Oral argument in this case took place 
on March 14, 2011. David Weiss of coalition-partner the Center for Death Penalty Litigation 
argued the case for the Appellants. Supreme Court Hearing on Executions, WRAL.COM 
(March 14, 2011), available at http://www.wral.com/news/video/9266150/#/vid9266150 
(video of North Carolina Supreme Court hearing arguments). 
 175. Woodward, supra note 67, at 171-72. 
488 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2011:463 
This approach fits nicely into what others have identified as a “legal 
mobilization approach.”176 This approach recognizes that “specific legal 
tactics and practices . . . often have multiple motivations and complex ef-
fects.”177 
A review of the North Carolina NAACP and NCCM as social move-
ments documents the coalitions’ particular strengths as they approached the 
racial justice act campaign. The two social movements had also placed 
themselves in a strong position to work cooperatively. NCCM belongs to 
the North Carolina NAACP HKonJ coalition; the North Carolina NAACP 
belongs to NCCM.178 
It is equally important to consider the context in which the campaign 
operated. 
III. READY TO LISTEN? A CHANGING LANDSCAPE CREATES FERTILE 
GROUND FOR CHANGE 
Both social movement theory and social psychology suggest the im-
portance of changes in landscape to a reform movement like the RJA cam-
paign. Bear in mind that the NCCM had been around for forty-five years 
(though with a different name) and RJA bills had been introduced in the 
General Assembly a number of times between 1999 and 2009.179 Indeed, 
support for capital punishment had been strong and stable for years follow-
ing the reinstatement of the death penalty in 1977. Efforts to limit the im-
pact of race in the administration of the death penalty largely stagnated in 
the last quarter century. McCleskey had shut the door on empirical evidence 
on the impact of race, and courts have been loath to open it even a crack.180 
In sharp contrast to the narrative on race and capital punishment, the 
larger narrative about the use of capital punishment shifted dramatically 
during this period. This new narrative may have opened the door in North 
Carolina to fresh consideration of the corrupting influence of race on the 
system. To be precise, North Carolina’s experiences of wrongful convic-
tions may have catalyzed a shift in public opinion that can help explain the 
passage of the RJA. 
  
 176. Michael W. McCann, Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of 
Legal Mobilization 10 (1994). 
 177. Id. 
 178. HKONJ, http://www.hkonj.com/ (last visited July 21, 2011) (listing NCCM as a 
coalition member under the “Partners for HK on J” heading); Advocacy, supra note 149 
(listing NAACP as a partner). 
 179. See infra note 234 and accompanying text; infra note 256. 
 180. Baldus, Woodworth & Grosso, supra note 5, at 144; Johnson, supra note 4, at 
180; Evans v. State, 914 A.2d 25 (Md. 2006) (rejecting race discrimination claims). 
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A. Exonerations Undermine Basic Presumptions About the Death Penalty 
The landscape in which a social movement operates is critical; even 
the best-connected and savviest organization needs conditions to be ripe to 
implement reform.181 The social movement itself can facilitate these optimal 
conditions through its efforts to persuade the public and lawmakers of the 
merits of its case. But developments with no direct relation to the issue at 
hand can also affect the viability of reform. Sometimes these shifts are 
gradual, and sometimes they come about because of a crisis in a related 
field that upends assumptions that justify the current system.182 The crisis 
provokes an “episode of contention” in which the effectiveness of the sys-
tem is called into question and the relevant actors look to proximate fields 
for solutions.183 
The civil rights movement provides an example of a movement facili-
tated by exogenous developments. Socio-legal scholar Doug McAdam 
points to several ostensibly unrelated environmental factors that contributed 
to the success of that movement.184 The Cold War raised the stakes in Amer-
ica’s international image of a free and democratic society, and at the same 
time the decline of the southern textile industry undermined the power of 
white segregationists.185 All the while, black churches were gaining strength 
and ultimately formed the basis of the civil rights movement.186 Once the 
external conditions were ripe, the institutional strength of the black churches 
allowed movement leaders to seize the moment of political opportunity.187 
The innocence movement created a similar “episode of contention.” 
While not framed as a movement about racism, the innocence movement 
upended assumptions about the basic fairness and efficacy of the system. 
  
 181. Melinda D. Kane, Social Movement Policy Success: Decriminalizing State Sod-
omy Laws, 1969-1998, 8 MOBILIZATION: INT’L J. 313, 324 (2003). 
 182. For example, disruption caused by World War I may have facilitated support for 
women’s suffrage. Daniel J. Tichenor, The Presidency, Social Movements, and Contentious 
Change: Lessons from the Woman’s Suffrage and Labor Movements, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. 
Q. 14, 15-19 (1999). 
 183. Lauren B. Edelman, Gwendolyn Leachman & Doug McAdam, On Law, Organi-
zations, and Social Movements, 6 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 653, 655, 672 (2010); see also 
HAINES, supra note 17, at 21 (discussing the political process theory of social movements 
and social change). 
 184. DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK 
INSURGENCY, 1930-1970 (2d ed. 1999). 
 185. Id. at 73, 82-83. 
 186. Id. at 90-92. 
 187. Id. 
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These assumptions had justified the Court’s refusal to entertain the possibil-
ity of entrenched and pervasive biases in the system.188 
In the ten years preceding the passage of the RJA, six high-profile ex-
onerations took place in North Carolina, including those of five death row 
inmates.189 Three of the six exonerations took place after 2005.190 The exon-
erations directly implicated prosecutorial misconduct and incompetent de-
fense counsel. For instance, Alan Gell was convicted of murder in 1995 and 
sent to death row.191 When it was later discovered that the prosecution with-
held material evidence favorable to the defense, Gell’s conviction was va-
cated, and he was acquitted at a retrial.192 Glen Edward Chapman was con-
victed of murder in 1994.193 One of his attorneys admitted drinking up to 
twelve shots of alcohol a day in the capital trial of another (since executed) 
defendant.194 These exonerations garnered significant attention in the North 
Carolina media.195 
Concerns about wrongful convictions spurred North Carolina Chief 
Justice I. Beverly Lake to convene the North Carolina Actual Innocence 
  
 188. For an excellent study on the impact of the wrongful conviction cases on support 
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Feb. 18, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-02-18-death-row_x.htm; A Par-
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OBSERVER, Apr. 22, 2004, available at http://www.ncmoratorium.org/News.aspx?li=1068; 
Pete Bowne, Former N.C. Prosecutors Facing Hearing For Withholding Death-Penalty 
Case Evidence, DIGTRIAD (Sept. 21, 2004, 5:17 AM), http://www.digtriad.com/news 
/local/story.aspx?storyid=30990. 
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Commission in 2002 (“the Commission”).196 Justice Lake attracted a diverse 
group of leaders to talk about wrongful convictions in North Carolina and to 
suggest reforms that would improve the system.197 The Commission rec-
ommended reforms to eyewitness identification procedures in October 2003 
and the creation of the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission (the 
“Innocence Inquiry Commission”) in 2006.198 The Innocence Inquiry Com-
mission is unique in that it authorizes its members to review cases with new 
evidence of innocence and to vacate a conviction upon a showing of clear 
and convincing evidence of innocence.199 
The experience of the exonerees and the work of the Commission and 
the Innocence Inquiry Commission made the national innocence movement 
highly relevant to North Carolina. Developments like these undermine 
complacency about the system’s effectiveness, especially when they bring 
to light widespread problems that cannot be dismissed as case-specific iso-
lated aberrations. This phenomenon is aptly illustrated by the sequence of 
events triggered by the exoneration of Greg Taylor, the Innocence Inquiry 
Commission’s first. 
In February 2010, the Innocence Inquiry Commission vacated the 
conviction of Greg Taylor, who had spent sixteen years in prison for a mur-
der that he did not commit.200 Investigation into his case revealed a lack of 
candor in the serological tests offered by the state.201 A significant portion of 
the state’s case against him rested on evidence of blood found on his car, 
but the SBI’s report omitted the fact that more sensitive follow-up tests did 
not indicate the presence of blood.202 
This discovery prompted an independent investigation of the North 
Carolina State Bureau of Investigation (SBI).203 Two former FBI agents 
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 197. Id. at 650-51. 
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 203. CHRIS SWECKER & MICHAEL WOLF, AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE SBI 
FORENSIC LABORATORY 2-3 (2010), available at http://ncdoj.gov/getdoc/0a92ee81-0667-
4935-b2d3-221d4f586c61/Independent-Review-of-SBI-Forensic-LAB.aspx. 
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reviewed 15,419 serology laboratory files from cases from 1987 to 2003.204 
Of those, 230 revealed that lab workers had provided incomplete and mis-
leading reports about serological testing in more than 200 cases between 
1987 and 2003.205 The study found that laboratory reports were more forth-
coming about tests that bolstered the state’s case, but often omitted test re-
sults that would have supported the defense.206 The former FBI agent who 
conducted the audit, while finding that there was no evidence that files or 
reports were deliberately suppressed,207 stated that the problems stemmed in 
part from “poorly crafted policy” and a “lack of objectivity.”208 
The investigation generated bad publicity for the SBI,209 creating an 
opportunity not lost on the NCCM’s leadership.210 These developments led 
the state House of Representatives to vote unanimously to approve changes 
in the operation and oversight of the crime laboratory.211 Some of the ques-
tionable reports were prepared in capital cases, including those of four peo-
ple still on death row at the time of the report, and three who had been exe-
cuted.212 The SBI’s misfeasance in a particular case does not mean that the 
aggrieved defendant was innocent. Yet the knowledge that the ostensibly 
objective evidence to which juries presumably accord great weight was the 
product not of objective well-trained scientists but that of biased advocates 
willing to spin the evidence to suit the state’s case likely struck a blow to 
the public’s confidence in the system.213 
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B. A New Narrative Emerges  
The innocence movement also changed the narrative about capital de-
fendants. Because a disproportionate number of the exonerated had been 
sentenced to death,214 their stories changed how people thought about the 
death penalty. Psychologists have long recognized that people are moved 
more by anecdotes than statistics.215 Numbers—no matter how big—don’t 
capture people’s interest and empathy the way a story does.216 For the dec-
ades following the reinstatement of the death penalty in the United States,217 
the most readily-accessible anecdotes typically featured monstrous killers 
who stayed alive on the taxpayer dime while defense attorneys and other 
bleeding hearts searched for a technicality to allow the criminal to avoid 
justice. Meanwhile, the families of these remorseless killers’ victims waited 
in agony for closure.218 
While that narrative is still salient, exonerations brought to light sto-
ries of a different kind of victimization—those of people wrongfully ac-
cused of the most serious crimes and shuffled through the system.219 Their 
cases did not get the kind careful attention many presumed death penalty 
cases automatically receive. Their stories had casts that included sleeping 
defense attorneys, incompetent (and occasionally malicious) forensic ana-
lysts who presented misleading laboratory results, eyewitnesses who picked 
the wrong person despite their best intentions, detectives who wore down 
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naïve or mentally challenged suspects into confessing falsely, and amoral 
snitches willing to say anything to catch a break in their own cases.220 These 
anecdotes created a competing narrative, putting a human face and a “there 
but for the grace of God go I” element to the statistics. 
The story changed even though the underlying reality had not. No evi-
dence suggests that the system has become less accurate over time, or that 
arbitrary factors like race play more of a role now than they did twenty 
years ago.221 Although defendants had been exonerated from death row be-
fore the advent of DNA technology, those cases were necessarily more am-
biguous and did not upend faith in the system overall. In contrast, DNA 
exonerations were smoking guns of failure. The defendant was exonerated 
not merely because he dismantled the state’s case, but because he provided 
affirmative and indisputable evidence that the state prosecuted the wrong 
person. The stories of exonerees became harder to ignore. 
This new narrative—constructed from vivid anecdotes—paved the 
way for serious consideration of ways in which the system can be corrupted. 
One such potentially corrupting influence is that of race. Contrast the 
McCleskey Court’s reluctance to rely on credible statistical findings of dis-
crimination with the RJA’s express authorization of the use of this evidence. 
This new narrative may have opened the door in North Carolina to fresh 
consideration of what data can tell us about racism in the system.  
The chilled reception for empirically sound findings of race effects in 
various death penalty systems demonstrates how statistics that contradict 
what we believe to be true can be disregarded as mere “numerology” and 
dismissed.222 In contrast, statistics become much more palatable when they 
comport with existing beliefs. Courts are receptive to statistical evidence in 
many contexts, such as school segregation, voting rights cases, and em-
ployment discrimination, because the statistical information comports with 
dominant beliefs.223 The new narrative of innocence created an opportunity 
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to consider whether race played a role in decision making and the need to 
do so rigorously, with the best possible evidence, including rigorous empiri-
cal evidence. The combination of a strong social movement and shifts in the 
cultural landscape caused by the innocence movement created an opportuni-
ty for reform. 
IV. SEIZING AN OPPORTUNITY: THE MOVEMENT TO PASS THE RACIAL 
JUSTICE ACT 
We situate the RJA within the larger movement to address the role of 
race in capital punishment and criminal justice because of the strength of 
the Act itself toward this objective. As noted above, McCleskey invited 
state-level legislation, and national and state actors worked to pass racial 
justice acts beginning in 1987. Yet with the exception of Kentucky, these 
efforts have failed.224 The RJA, in contrast, not only passed, but passed with 
language that allows for a meaningful inquiry into the role of race. 
As discussed above, lawyers who participated in NCCM brought a 
particular expertise as coalition members. The RJA text reflects this exper-
tise in its clear response to the impact of McCleskey on litigation, the con-
tinuing role of race in jury selection, and the limits of the Kentucky Racial 
Justice Act.225 The first two of these topics are discussed directly in testimo-
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ny by capital defense attorneys before two legislative study commissions in 
the years leading up to the passage of the RJA.226 According to Center for 
Death Penalty litigation attorney Kenneth Rose, “[l]anguage about peremp-
tory strikes was included in the earliest proposal considered by a N.C. legis-
lative study commission (2006). . . . because of the lack of enforcement of 
Batson by the N.C. courts.”227 This expertise directly influenced coalition 
priorities during the legislative process.228 These coalition partners worked 
in cooperation with other coalition members to advance debate on the role 
of race in capital punishment. The attorneys’ involvement, however, 
brought additional legal sophistication to the conversation. 
Equally important, the two movements discussed above brought a 
great deal of momentum to this campaign. As noted above, the 2003 NCCM 
name change signaled a significant re-framing of the campaign. At the time 
of the change in name, coalition partners engaged in a statewide campaign 
to pass a two year moratorium on executions.229 After months of organizing, 
the North Carolina Senate passed a moratorium bill.230 North Carolina and 
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the coalition partners made national news and hopes were high. A year later 
the House failed to take up the bill, which died.231 Faced with this failure 
and the difficulty garnering support behind a new moratorium bill,232 coali-
tion partners before long refocused their attention exclusively on particular 
reforms like the racial justice act.233 They brought to the racial justice act 
campaign the relationships they developed through the moratorium cam-
paigns among coalition partners and across the state, as well as their hard-
won expertise in grassroots development, policy advocacy, and media rela-
tions. In particular, the North Carolina NAACP under Rev. Dr. Barber’s 
strong leadership brought all of the experience of the voter empowerment 
campaign. 
The RJA had been introduced in the North Carolina General Assembly 
at least three times before 2009.234 Once the North Carolina NAACP and 
NCCM identified the RJA as the top priority for 2009, the coalitions and 
coalition partners brought their well-practiced campaign skills to the table—
working with media consultants, hiring pollsters, and nurturing alliances. As 
they had in support of voter empowerment and moratorium bills,235 coalition 
partners organized events to garner support for the RJA. Murder Victims’ 
Families for Reconciliation gathered on the steps of the various county 
courthouses and government buildings to appeal to law makers to support 
the RJA.236 Religious groups in the coalition organized similar events.237 The 
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NAACP held press conferences, accompanied by the Representatives 
Womble and Parmon, Senator McKissick, and black death row exonerees.238 
Rev. Dr. Barber understood the RJA as entirely consistent with civil 
rights and basic fairness, and framed it that way to the press by highlighting 
the recent exonerations of three black men in North Carolina from death 
row.239 In 2008, after the RJA died in the General Assembly, Rev. Dr. Bar-
ber stated, “‘We’ve had three black men released from death row. . . . I be-
lieve that if we had had three wealthy men, three white men, exonerated like 
this, everybody would be declaring that our justice system is broken.’”240 To 
legislators, Rev. Dr. Barber took a gentler tack, acknowledging elected offi-
cials’ anxiety about supporting the bill: “‘We understand our representatives 
must face the voters. But you also must look in the mirror. . . . And we must 
also look into the faces of African-Americans who have been victimized by 
racism in the criminal justice system.’”241 
The RJA campaign garnered broad participation from the North Caro-
lina NAACP and NCCM coalition partners and widespread grassroots sup-
port. Through the campaign, the RJA movement invited conversations about 
race and the role of race in criminal justice at all levels—from Rev. Dr. 
Barber’s statements to the media to the legislative debate. When the RJA 
became law, coalition leaders “hailed the law . . . as a landmark step toward 
ending . . . a pervasive pattern of racism in the criminal-justice system.”242 
CONCLUSION 
Opponents of the RJA have argued that it has more to do with ending 
the death penalty than achieving racial justice.243 This point of view is un-
derstandable, as the NCCM advocates for a moratorium and some of its 
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members favor outright abolition.244 But the RJA is significant for reasons 
that extend beyond its application to the extraordinary cases (even in a state 
like North Carolina with a sizeable death row) that result in a death sen-
tence. Claims brought under the RJA will compel a thorough and painstak-
ing examination of the role of race in the criminal justice system. 
In that regard, the potential significance of the RJA goes beyond capi-
tal cases. One of the concerns articulated by the McCleskey Court was that 
recognizing racial bias in the administration of the death penalty would nec-
essarily call into question the fairness of the system generally. Death is dif-
ferent, to be sure, but proof of racial bias in capital cases would at least raise 
suspicion that it infects other parts of the system too.  
On April 20, 2012, a North Carolina trial court ruled that race was, in 
fact, a significant factor in the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges 
in North Carolina at the time of Marcus Robinson's capital trial. The court 
vacated Mr. Robinson's death sentence and resentenced him to life in prison 
without the possibility of parole.245 This reduction of even one death sen-
tence based on a finding of systematic race discrimination in capital prose-
cutions is simply unprecedented. While the results of the appeals process 
and the impact of this decision and other factors on other pending cases 
remain to be seen, the implications of this decision and the ongoing litiga-
tion could be significant for several additional reasons. 
First, the litigation provides a forum in which to scrutinize how well 
the system functions. A claimant operating under the McCleskey framework 
would have to assert evidence of discrimination specific to his or her own 
case. Even when evidence of this sort is available, it offers at best a window 
for speculation about what might be happening in other cases. Any one case 
of misconduct can be dismissed as an aberration,246 signifying little about 
the system as a whole. When problematic findings about the system do 
come to light, it is generally through academic publications, which can be 
dismissed as smoke and mirrors.247  
  
 244. NCCM’s website states that “[w]hile some members of the Coalition may ap-
proach the issue as abolitionists, many feel that if North Carolina is going to have an active 
death penalty, every effort must be made to eliminate the arbitrariness, racial disparities, 
hidden evidence and classist approach that has characterized NC’s death penalty since its 
inception.” About the North Carolina Coalition for a Moratorium, N.C. COALITION FOR A 
MORATORIUM, http://www.ncmoratorium.org/whoweare.aspx (last visited June 22, 2011). 
 245. North Carolina v. Robinson, No. 91 CRS 23143, at *44-46, available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/marcus_robinson_order.pdf. 
 246. For instance, the National District Attorneys Association called North Carolina 
prosecutor Mike Nifong’s mishandling of the rape allegations leveled against Duke lacrosse 
players “an aberration.” Laura Parker, Trial This Week for Prosecutor in Duke Case, USA 
TODAY, June 10, 2007, at 3A.  
 247. McErlean, supra note 243 (quoting prosecutor Dewey Hudson, stating that “‘you 
can prove anything with stats and numbers’”). 
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Under the RJA, however, this kind of evidence is presented and tested 
in court.248 Findings of bias may not be dismissed summarily or ignored, but 
must be tested and rebutted with specificity. This process—even if it does 
not result in relief for the litigant—serves an important function by bringing 
this evidence into the public’s consciousness. 
To that end, the RJA’s supporters did not assume their work was done 
once they had persuaded the legislature to pass it. The North Carolina 
NAACP and NCCM conducted a campus tour entitled “Race, Wrongful 
Convictions and the Death Penalty” during the summer of 2010, before any 
defendant had filed a claim or any study results had been released.249 Partic-
ipants engaged in panel discussions about the role of race in capital punish-
ment and the passage of the RJA.250 Speakers included not only prominent 
attorneys and academics, but also a former death row inmate, Darryl Hunt, 
and Jennifer Thompson Cannino, whose mistaken eyewitness identification 
of an African American man sent him to prison for a rape he did not com-
mit.251 
Keeping the arguments for the necessity of the RJA before the public 
serves two objectives. First, it keeps political opponents seeking to repeal or 
radically limit the scope of the RJA from controlling how the issue is 
framed. Opponents argue that the law does nothing to further accuracy in 
that it requires no evidence of innocence to state a claim for relief.252 More-
over, rather than promoting racial fairness, the RJA undermines it by 
“perpetuat[ing] a fixation on race to the detriment of fairness and reason.”253 
By reminding the public of the human faces behind the statistics, the coali-
tion ensures that debate about the RJA is not depicted as one pitting cold, 
easily manipulated numbers against common sense. 
Fears of repeal of the legislation are not unfounded. Republicans took 
control of the North Carolina legislature in November 2010. During the 
campaign, the state Republican Party mailed a flyer that depicted mug shots 
of two death row inmates, Wayne Laws and Henry McCollum, to house-
holds in districts with contested races.254 The flyer described their brutal 
  
 248. See, for example, North Carolina v. Robinson, No. 91 CRS 23143, at *44-46, 
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/marcus_robinson_order.pdf. 
 249. 2010 NORTH CAROLINA CAMPUS TOUR (2010), available at www.unc.edu/ 
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 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
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crimes and cautioned the targeted voters that because of their “ultra-liberal” 
representative, Laws and McCollum “might be moving out of jail and into 
[y]our neighborhood sometime soon.”255 
New House Majority Leader Paul Stam joined other Republican law-
makers in pronouncing their intent to repeal the RJA.256 On April 4, 2011, 
Representative Stam co-sponsored House Bill 615, which proposed to 
amend the RJA to make it “consistent with the United States Supreme 
Court’s Ruling in McCleskey v. Kemp.”257 If passed, the bill will render the 
RJA redundant with the constitutional protections already recognized by the 
Supreme Court. 
Legislators, the North Carolina NAACP, and NCCM coalition mem-
bers repeatedly mobilized RJA campaign participants to defeat the repeal 
bill. The North Carolina Legislative Black Caucus “denounced” the effort to 
repeal the Act with caucus chairman McKissick noting, “Passing this repeal 
would be a giant step backwards for justice in North Carolina.”258 Rev. Dr. 
Barber and several other community members calling themselves the “State 
in Emergency Seven” staged a protest at the capital to voice their opposition 
to several proposed Republican measures, including budget cuts and a re-
peal of the RJA.259 Letters to the editor and editorials appeared in state and 
local newspapers.260 While the bill passed the House, the Senate adjourned 
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Legislators resumed debate on this bill in November 2011 and passed 
it shortly thereafter.262  Governor Bev Perdue vetoed the bill on December 
14, 2011.263  The Senate voted to override the veto, but the House of Repre-
sentatives appeared not to have the votes necessary for an override and re-
ferred the bill to a legislative committee on January 4, 2012.264  Repeal ef-
forts continued until the publication of this article in May 2012.265 
NCCM’s involvement in holding off the repeal effort provided yet an-
other forum for discussing the importance of race in North Carolina’s crim-
inal justice system and the need for reform. If the evidence presented in 
litigation establishes (or at least raises the strong possibility) that race con-
tinues to play a role in capital trials, questions should arise about fairness in 
non-capital cases as well. Capital cases constitute only a small fraction of 
criminal cases, but they are often where more broadly applicable reforms 
originate. Compared to garden variety felony cases, capital cases receive 
intense scrutiny and are therefore more likely to reveal serious errors in how 
the system functions, prompting reforms. The arguments for reform, how-
ever, often apply with equal force to non-capital cases. For instance, North 
Carolina enacted open-file discovery initially only for capital prosecutions, 
but later extended it to all felony cases.266 
Second, for the individual litigants, RJA claims may have indirect ef-
fects. A respectable showing of racial bias that falls short of convincing a 
judge to grant relief under the RJA might render other claims more plausi-
ble.267 Johnson considered this possibility when her client lost a claim of 
race discrimination, but won an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
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such claims in other cases.268 Although the issues of race discrimination and 
ineffective assistance of counsel were theoretically distinct, it is not hard to 
see how decision makers’ assessments of one claim can affect assessments 
of another. In the case of the RJA, such an effect would not necessarily be 
irrational. Doubts about whether the process was truly free of improper bias 
should prompt one to question how fair it was in other respects. 
Finally, making race salient may give rise to a sense of accountability 
in capital decision makers and spur them to monitor themselves for bias 
more vigilantly. Social psychological research shows that bias may be im-
plicit, and that making the possibility of bias salient causes people to moni-
tor and correct for it.269 Kentucky’s RJA has led to no successful claims, but 
some evidence suggests that the Act may have diminished biased decision 
making because the relevant actors know that they may someday be asked 
to account for their decisions.270 
Many of the circumstances described above exist in other states, but 
they did not pass a statute like the RJA. Kentucky passed its Racial Justice 
Act271 in 1998, but its requirements render it toothless in addressing race 
discrimination directly.272 In contrast, the RJA offers a meaningful oppor-
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forth in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-93 (1987) (denying McCleskey’s equal pro-
tection claim because he did not offer “evidence specific to his own case that would support 
an inference that racial considerations played a part in his sentence”). While the Kentucky 
law is silent as to the appropriate geographic scope of inquiry, it has been understood to 
require that any proof of discrimination come from the defendant’s county. Baldus & 
Woodworth, supra note 10, at 1467, 1467 n.215 (2004). The RJA states repeatedly that a 
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tunity to examine the role of race in the death penalty and beyond. It is too 
early to measure final outcomes or to declare a complete victory with the 
RJA. But its passage demonstrates that North Carolina hosts a complex so-
cial movement, worthy of additional study not only for their success at pass-
ing the RJA but for their ability to work together while maintaining separate 
roles, and a law that breaks new ground in our collective effort to confront 
the legacy of racism in the criminal justice system. 
 
  
discrimination claim may be based on decisions “in the county, the prosecutorial district, the 
judicial division, or the State.” N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2011(a)-(c), 15A-2012(a). 
  Second, the Kentucky law requires the defendant to prove “that race was the 
basis of the decision to seek the death penalty” and to prove it “by clear and convincing 
evidence.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.300(5) (emphasis added). The RJA requires that race 
be “a significant factor,” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2012(a), rather than “the basis of the deci-
sion,” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.300(5). The statute states that the defendant must state his 
or her claim “with particularity,” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2012(a), and adopts the general 
procedures for a motion for appropriate relief where “the moving party has the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence every fact essential to support the motion,” N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1420(c)(5). 
  The same section of the Kentucky act limits claims to discrimination in “the 
decision to seek the death penalty.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.300(5). As a result, the de-
fendant may raise claims based only on prosecutorial charging decisions. In contrast, the 
North Carolina act expressly authorizes claims based on the decision “to seek or impose a 
death sentence,” i.e., prosecutorial charging decisions and jury sentencing decisions, as well 
as “decisions to exercise peremptory challenges during jury selection.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
15A-2011(a)-(b). 
  Finally, the Kentucky law did “not apply to sentences imposed prior to July 15, 
1998,” the effective date of the act. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.305. As noted above, North 
Carolina’s law provides all defendants under a death sentence on the effective date of the law 
one year in which to file a motion. North Carolina Racial Justice Act, 2009-464 N.C. Sess. 
Laws § 2. 
